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STATEMENT OF THE CASc
Nature Of The Case
Gina Doneil Standley appeais from ner judgment of conviction and sentence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Stand:ey sold a gram of rnethamphetamine to a confidential informant.
p.2.)

The state charged Standiey with delivery of methamphetamine.

(PSI,

(R., p.14.)

Standley entered into a plea agreement (R., pp.22-24), pursuant to which she pied
guiity to the delivery charge (12/22/2010 Tr., p.18, Ls.4-7). The district court entered
judgment and imposed a unified sentence of ten years with two years fixed. (R., pp.5051.) Standley filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.57-59.)

•1

I

ISSUES
Standley states the

as:

1.
Did the district court err in
to order a mental health evaluation
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, as
court had reason to believe
Stand!ey's mental health condition would be a significant factor at
sentencing, and was the error not harmless?
?

Did the district court
jurisdiction?

discretion by failing to

'-·

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Standley failed to show fundamental error in the lack of a psychological
evaluation for her sentencing for delivery of methamphetamine?
2.
Has Standley failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing
discretion in not retaining jurisdiction?
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Standley Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The Lack Of A Psychological
Evaluation At Sentencin
A.

!ntroduction
Standley never requested that the court order a mental health evaluation for

sentencing.

(See generally 12/22/2010 Tr.)

For the first time on appeal, Standley

asserts that the district court's failure to sua sponte order an evaluation constitutes
reversible error. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-9.) Standley does not claim that this aileged
1

error is fundamental, nor does she invoke the ''manifest disregard" standard; rather she
apparently assumes that this alleged error is given free review without any preservation
below.

(Id.)

Standley's claim of error cannot be reached because it was neither

preserved below nor shown to be fundamental error on appeal.

:3.

Standard Of Review

"it is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).

Absent a timely objection, the

appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental
error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227,245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).

Because Standley has not invoked the "manifest disregard" standard, but rather
affirmatively rejected it (see Appellant's brief, p.6 n.4), she has waived any claim that it
applies in this case. Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 46, 218 P.3d 388, 390 (2009) (citing
I.A.R 35 (a)(6) and holding that issues not raised and supported with both argument
and authority are waived). Therefore the "manifest disregard" standard is not further
addressed in this brief.
3

Standley's Claim Of Error Cannot Be Reviewed On Appeal
Idaho Supreme Court has held that

an error
authority to remedy

preserved for appeal through objection at trial, the

that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant
being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due ,...,.,...,.,,...,,. right to a fair trial in a
"where an error has

fair tribunal." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976.

occurred at trial and was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, such error shall

only be reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to an appellate court that one of
his unwaived constitutional rights was plainly violated."

kl

at 226, 245 P.3d at 978

(emphasis added). "[l]n the absence of a timely objection in the trial court, relief will be
afforded on appeal for an error in a criminal trial only if the defendant shows that it
amounts to fundamental error." State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24,

, 266 P.3d 499, 508

(Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added).
Standley did not preserve her appellate claim below and makes no attempt to
demonstrate fundamental error in this appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.5-9.) The first
prong of the fundamental error analysis requires an appellant to show that her
"unwaived constitutional rights were violated" Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978
(emphasis added).

Any effort to establish fundamental error is therefore doomed to

failure because there is no constitutional right to a court-ordered psychological
evaluation for sentencing. Rather, the entitlement Standley seeks is statutory at best.
(See LC. § 19-2522.)
Second, Standley must establish that the error is plain on the record. Perry, 150
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Under Idaho Code§ 19-2522, a district court shall order

4

a mental heaith report from a licensed psychiatrist only wheri there is both "reason to
bc!ieve the mental condition of the defendant will be a sigriificant factor at sentencing
and for good cause shown." I.C. § 19-2522(1). Standley has failed to establish that
either prerequisite was clearly met on the record.
On appeal, Standiey argues that the district court should have recognized that
her treated aneurysrr. and residual grief from the death of hei son several years prior to
her crime would be significant factors at sentencing. (AppeHant's brief, pp.6-7.) At her
arraignment, the district court discussed with Standley whether she had any mental
health concerns as follows:
Now do you have any psychological or mental problems which might
have a bearing on your case?

Q.

A. Well, I do take lots of medications.
diabetes.

I take one for nightmares and

Q. All right. For nightmares and what else?

A. For my diabetes.
Q. Diabetes. Okay.

A. Yes.
Q. Do either of those medications or the conditions for which you are
treated interfere in any way with your ability to understand what we are
doing here in court, with making any decisions about your case and with
assisting Mr. Barrett in your defense?
A. No.

So you understand what's going on and you are able to make
decisions about how to proceed with your case?
Q.

A. Yeah.

5

Q. Is that yes?

A. Yes.
(12/22/2010 Tr., p.14, L.14 - p.15, L.9.) Considering Standley's assertion below that
the she had no mental health concerns that could inhibit her ability to understand and
participate in the proceedings, and her counsel's apparent assent to those assertions
(compare 12/22/2010 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-18 and p.9, L.15- p.10, L.8 with p.14, L.14- p.15,
L. 9), that these factors would play a "significant role" at sentencing or that there was
"good cause shown,; is anything but clear.
Finally, Standley must establish prejudice.
P.3d at 978.

See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245

On the facts of this case, that is impossible to do.

Standley's mental

health did not play a factor at sentencing (see generally 5/4/2011 Tr.), nor should it
have. The only significant factor considered by the district court in crafting its sentence,

which focused on Standley's rehabilitation as a confessed drug addict, was her

substance abuse and addiction. (See 5/4/2011 Tr., p.31, L.20 - p.36, L.1.) The district
court in fact ordered the one report that would be useful to it at sentencing: a substance
abuse evaluation. (R., p.27.) It is difficult to conceive of any significant factor a treated
brain aneurysm or residual grief would play in the sentencing of a confessed addict on a
routine delivery conviction.
Because Standley's appellate claim of error was not preserved and has not been
shown to be fundamental error, this Court cannot review it.
Standley makes no argument that appellate review of her unpreserved claim of
error is appropriate. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) The closest she comes is an argument
that the district court should have ruled on the necessity of an evaluation in the absence
6

cf an objection. (Appei!ant's brief, p.6 ("By the plain language of the statute Itself, the
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argu:-nent is uiiirnate!y irre'.evant to the quest!on of whether this Court should reach
Standley's apper:c:,te claim of error.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State
v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. Bateman-Hall. Inc ..
139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.2d 951, 954 (2003).

Because "the best guide to legis!aiive

intent" is the words of the statute, the i:lterpretaUon of a statute must begin with the
literal words of the statute.

State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732

(2009). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it but
simply follows the law as written. Mclean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho
810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable
of only one reasonable interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, _ ,
265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that Court might not give
effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was "palpably absurd").
As noted above, Idaho Code§ 19-2522 provides that the trial court "shall" order a
psychological evaluation if there is "reason to believe" mental health will be a significant
factor at sentencing and "for good cause shown." I.C. § 19-2522(1 ). The language of
this statute, plain or otherwise, says nothing about appeliate review. Standley has failed
to articulate why any language of the statute has any relevance to standards of

7

appellate review, much less that the legislature intended to do away with the
requirement that appellate claims be either preserved or shown to be fundamental error.
Standley argues that LC. § 19-2522(1) imposes a mandatory duty on the trial
court to order an evaluation in appropriate cases regardless of whether the parties have
requested such an evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6. 2 ) Implicit in this argument is
the claim that by removing the trial court's discretion the legislature also eliminated the
requirement of preserving claims of error for appellate review.

This unarticulated

argument is meritless. The fundamental error rule is not limited to only the discretionary
decisions of the trial court.

A directive that the trial court "shall" do something is

irrelevant to whether the appellate court will review an unpreserved claim of error. The
assumption necessary to complete Standley's argument, that limiting the trial court's
discretion by use of the phrase "court shall" is a plain legislative directive that the normal
rules of preservation of appellate issues do not apply, is not supported by the plain
language of the statute.
In addition, Standley's argument lacks support in the law.

The phrase "court

shall" appears over 1,000 times in the Idaho Code. (Search for phrase "court shall" in
Westlaw database for the Idaho Code, unannotated.) The phrase appears 97 times in
titles 18 (criminal code) and 19 (criminal procedure) alone. (Same search.) Despite the
ubiquity of this phrase in the Idaho Code, Standley can cite to no authority that the
language she relies on has ever been held to do away with the requirement that parties
preserve objections for appellate review. It is telling that Standley cannot find a single
2

The phrase "for good cause shown" in I.C. § 19-2522(1) shows that Standley's basic
premise-that a trial court has the obligation in every criminal case to search the record
and evaluate the need for a psychological evaluation and rule on that issue regardless
of the lack of a motion-is also without merit.
8

ir:stance where the phrase "court sha1i" has aven been deemed relevant to whether an
issue has been preserved fer appe!late review despite the fact that the phrase is
common in the Idaho Code.
Standley has offered nc arg;Jrnent for why this Court should considei her
unpreserved claim of error. The assumption she apparently makes that the legislature
has done away with the requirement of preservation does not withstand analysis.
Because it was neither preserved below nor shown to be fundamental error on appeal,
Standley's appellate claim cannot be addressed.

11.
Standley Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion

A

Introduction
Upon Standley's conviction for delivering methamphetamine, the district court

imposed a unified sentence of ten years with two years fixed.

(R., pp.50-51.)

On

appeal, Standley argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by not
retaining jurisdiction in light of allegedly mitigating factors. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.)
Standley has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore,

131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499,
873 P.2d 144 (1994)}.
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C.

Standley Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Not Retaining Jurisdiction
It is weil settled that "[w]hether to retain jurisdiction is a question left to the court's

discretion." State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 230, 832 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing I.C. § 19-2601(4); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709
(Ct App. 1982)). "When a court has sufficient information at the time of sentencing to
deny probation, its refusal to retain jurisdiction for further evaluation is not an abuse of
discretion."
1988).

!ft. (citing State v. Beebe, 113 Idaho 977, 979, 751 P .2d 673, 675 (Ct. App.

At sentencing, after considering Standley's medical issues, substance

addictions, failed history of treatment, her present crime, and the objectives of criminal
punishment, the district court concluded that probation was not an option in her case.
(5/4/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.12-16.) That conclusion was appropriate and is supported by
ample information.
As freely acknowledged on appeal, Standley is a drug addict. (See Appellant's
brief, p.11.) This is not the first time her addictions have led to criminal prosecutions. In
1996, she was convicted of use or possession of drug paraphernalia and one count of
distribution of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. (PSI, p.3.) In 2001,
she was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance. (Id.) In 2002, she was again
charged with delivery.

(Id., p.4.)

In 2003, she was convicted of possession of a

controlled substance and paraphernalia.

(Id.)

She was charged with possession of

paraphernalia in both 2004 and 2009, although one of those charges was dismissed
and the other was amended to frequenting.

(Id., pp.4-5.)

In 2010, she was again

convicted of possession of a controlled substance and the instant offense of delivery.
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Sta:.d!ey has received substantial ~ehab:!itativ'3 programming to overcome her
addictions, tut ;-iaS not been successful.

Standley "has participated i:1 in-patient

treatment, out-patient treatment, Fe!ony DrL;g Court, and the Therapeutic Community."
(PSI, p.13.) Not on!y has treatment been unavailing, but Standley failed the therapeutic
community, fai:ed felony drug court, and has refused to participate in Moral Reconation
Therapy (MRT) classes. (PSI, p.11.)
Standley has received several opportunities at community supervision, but she
has failed. In 2001, she was granted probation, but violated that probation by receiving
another felony charge in 2003. (PSI, p.5.) She was given the opportunity at a retained
jurisdiction and then continued on probation, but violated that probation again within two
months of her release and was sent to prison. (Id.) She was paroled, but then violated
her parole within a year of release and was returned to prison where she topped out her
time. (Id.) As noted by the presentence investigator:
Ms. Standley did not do well under supervision. She has a history of
absconding, testing positive for methamphetamine, and missing treatment
and meeting with her supervising officer. She also earned five Disciplinary
Reports while incarcerated.
(PSI, pp.5-6.)
Despite all of this, the district court still considered retaining jurisdiction, but
ultimately concluded:

i have thought about a retained jurisdiction but I think that given the
circumstances where you've been in the program before, you have been
out on parole, ycu have been revoked and gone back and topped your
time, and this is your th:rd felony, I simply must impose a prison sentence.

11

(5i4/2011 Tr., p.35, Ls.1-6.)
The district court's sentence of confinement appropriately addresses the relevant
factors of community protection, criminal deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment.
Because probation was not an option in Standley's case, the district court's refusal to
retain jurisdiction cannot represent an abuse of discretion. See Hernandez, 122 Idaho
at 230, 832 P.2d at 1166.

Standley has failed to establish an abuse of the district

court's discretion. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfuliy requests that this Court affirm Standley's conviction and
sentence.

DATED this 7th day of May, 2012.

.SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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